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The powers of emptiness 
 
Derek Hook   
London School of Economics & University of the Witwatersrand 
 
ABSTRACT: Foucault is often considered to be the commensurate theorist of 
power. His late work provides an impressive array of concepts that enables a 
multi-dimensional analysis of the historical, material and discursive facets of 
power. What is missing from this approach is the factor of passionate 
attachments, or what we might term the sublime motivations that underlie any 
regime of control. Lacan’s ethical thought prioritizes precisely the issue of the 
sublime, and, more to the point, the process of sublimation which establishes 
an effective ‘short-circuit’ between socially-valorised objects and direct drive 
satisfactions of individuals. Key here is the notion of das Ding, the place of 
the absent object of primordial satisfaction that generates libidinal enjoyment 
and draws the subject toward the pinnacle of social valorisation. Lacan thus 
shows us what Foucault cannot theorize. That is to say, if sublimation 
consists of a relation to the real of das Ding, then it cannot be limited in the 
terms of its activation to the powers of discursive domain alone; it remains a 
self-initiating and self-regulating form of power. 
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Sublime motivations 
The work of Michel Foucault has proved an important influence in the arena 
of the critical and theoretical psychology that Theory and Psychology has 
done so well to explore over the last 20 years. This has proved the case not 
only methodologically (Hook, 1999; Ibanez, 1991; Yates & Hiles, 2010), but 
also in terms of plotting the relation between power and subjectivity 
(Amigot & Pujal, 2009; Guilfoyle, 2007; Hook, 2002; Joy, 1993). While the 
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current paper wishes to make a contribution to this literature, it hopes to do 
so via means of an adjunct to Foucault’s theorization of power provided by 
another French intellectual whose work has itself gained increasing 
prominence in Theory and Psychology over the last several years (Dunker, 
2008; Malone, 2000, 2007, 2008; Parker, 2005, 2008; Shingu & Funaki, 
2008; Vanheule & Verhaeghe, 2001; Webb & Sells, 1995): Jacques Lacan.  
What is often elided in more polarizing comparisons of Foucault and 
Lacan’s work (Copjec, 1994) is the fact of an important parallel: both, 
theorists, at particular moments in their work, turn their attention to the topic 
of ethics (Rajchman, 1991). Lacan’s most developed engagement with this 
subject occurs in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. Foucault’s ethical turn forms 
part of his elaboration of the notion of technologies of subjectivity in the 
1980’s. This, as I will go on to argue, proves to be a telling comparison, one 
which shows up a potential weakness in Foucault’s ethical thought. 
Although his late conceptualizations of power – his influential notions of 
governmentality, biopolitics, disciplinarity, and so on - prove indispensable 
to any contemporary analytics of power, this formidable array of concepts 
nonetheless fails to grasp a crucial element in the maintenance of power. It is 
precisely in view of the Foucauldian approach to ethical technologies of the 
self, I claim, that we can isolate a crucial failing: the sublime motivations or 
‘passionate attachments’ underlying regimes of control. 
 My objective is not to dismiss the value and perspicacity of the above 
Foucauldian notions. To the contrary, one of my concerns lies with the 
question of how certain Foucauldian analytical devices might need to make 
reference to the unlikely ally of psychoanalysis so as to overcome blind-
spots introduced by an unwavering methodological commitment to 
genealogical historicism. Put differently, one might – oddly enough - 
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express a fidelity to Foucault even by way of recourse to psychoanalysis. An 
original line of speculation might be opened up in this way, by asking what 
extra-discursive powers of ‘the real’ – as opposed to productive ensembles 
of discourse - might come to be enlisted in the establishment of workable 
apparatuses of control. We should thus ask: what modes of impossibility, 
that is to say, what impasses of desire, what forms of libidinal enjoyment 
(jouissance) are implied (if not in fact presumed) within the conjunctions of 
power-knowledge that Foucault understands within the logic of the 
dispositif?  
 
Ethical technologies of self 
Given that I have discussed Foucault’s notion of ethics in some detail 
elsewhere (2007), I will limit myself to providing only a minimal outline 
here. For Foucault, and scholars like Dean (1999) Rose (1991, 1996) 
inspired by this period of his work, ethics is comprised of the ‘conduct of 
self-conduct’, those techniques of self whereby individuals affect a variety 
of operations “on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of 
being” (Foucault, 1988a, p. 18).  Of great importance for Foucault (1988b) is 
the fact that a potential gap separates normalizing, regulative technologies of 
subjectivity from their individualized activation and rearrangement. In the 
case of the former we have a series of regulative discursive routines of self-
knowledge and practice that are articulated in the norms of health and 
betterment. In the case of the latter we have the properly ethical domain of 
the personalized, indeed, aesthetic care of the self. This, in rudimentary 
terms, is the basic distinction between normative morality and ethical 
individuality. 
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 One of the strengths of this account, certainly for scholars like Rose, 
is that it shows how the realm of ethical individuality is all too often over-
determined by the values and practices of prevailing normative (and 
normalizing) morality. That is, Foucault’s account of technologies of 
subjectivity enables us to plot the downward saturation of power, to capture 
the interchange between structural apparatuses of influence and the micro-
politics of self in such a way that we are able to understand how ‘deeply’ 
private and personalized practices of self are already political operations 
linked to the broader objectives of the governmentality of the state. 
Now while it is important to note that the ethical technologies of self 
discussed by Foucault (1988c, 1988d) - unlike those analyzed by Rose 
(1991) - are drawn from a wide historical range, and are not always thus 
linked to explicitly normalizing expertise, or, indeed delimited by the 
protocols of disciplinary knowledge. Nonetheless, despite that for the later 
Foucault there is the possibility of ethical practices of freedom (1988c), this 
conceptualization nonetheless still runs up against a problem. Foucault’s 
ethical technologies of self seem oddly bloodless, detached from any 
motivating passions, lacking in affective intensity. Such a depiction hardly 
accords with the raptures of practice presumably accompanying the vigour 
of the ascetic preoccupations that Foucault (1988c, 1988d) himself 
discusses, such as those of spiritual, dietary or sexual discipline. These are 
not practices without a libidinal dimension; they are often linked precisely to 
‘sublime’ aims, to “the goals”, to quote Foucault “of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection and immortality” (1988a, p. 18) that are, for many worth 
living and dieing for.  
What is it then, we should ask, that drives and inspires such practices? 
Not surely simply the banal impetus of the “ideals of scientific, political and 
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philanthropic experts” (Rose, 1991, p. 213), the life-objectives prescribed by 
today’s generic norms of subjectivity? Surely these targets have to be 
understood against the context of a far more passionate set of attachments, 
especially so if we are to account for the subject-driven impetus that 
Foucault so often alludes to? 
We are here approaching the realm of the sublime, of something not 
motivated merely by biopolitical regulation, disciplinary normalization or 
diffused technologies of subjectivity and governmentality, however 
dispersed or discontinuous, for indeed, it is often precisely against such 
forces of the sublime – as in the case of the racist “national Thing” invoked 
by Žižek (1993) - that the state is obliged to act. Switching to a 
psychoanalytic register, one would say we have arrived at the question of the 
drives and their social mediation, or, more particularly, at the challenging 
issue of the drives in relation to sublimation, to what is accorded the highest 
values in a culture.  
 
The dilemmas of sublimation 
Lacan devotes the second section of Seminar VII, The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, to the problem of sublimation, to revising this key notion of 
Freudian thought that by 1959 had become so riddled with contradictions 
that its ongoing viability as a clinical tool was under serious threat. He opens 
with a clarification, underlining the fact that in sublimation one is dealing 
with the positive side of ethical thought, not with prohibitions and moral 
conscience, but with “moral and spiritual elevation” (1992, p. 87).  Many 
similar qualifications – such as the idea that there can be no complete 
sublimation - will follow in Lacan’s attempt to clear the way to a more 
workable understanding of the concept of sublimation. 
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A paramount concern in dealing with the confused state of the concept 
of sublimation lies with asserting the very plasticity of the drives. In 
opposition to the more gentrified view offered by ego psychology, Lacan 
affirms that there is no pre-accommodation of the drives animating the 
human organism to its world, no natural fit of objects to impulses, no 
ultimate resolution of the spectrum of drives into a unified genital form. 
”[T]he libido, with its paradoxical, archaic so-called pre-genital 
characteristics, with its eternal polymorphism, with its world of 
images…linked to different sets of drives associated with different 
stages…[evidences for us that] the whole microcosm has absolutely nothing 
to do with the macrocosm” (p. 92). What we are contending with in the drive 
is the irreducible character of archaic forms of libido; such ‘aspirations’ will 
never yield to full domestication: we are dealing with “a point of departure 
and a nucleus that is never completely resolved under… primacy of 
genitality or a pure and simple Vorstellung [idea]” (p. 93). In addition to the 
issue of the irreducible character of the archaic libido – i.e. the original 
recalcitrance of the drives, the fact that they never yield to full domestication 
- is the consideration that the drive has the resources of apparently limitless 
possibilities of substitution regards its ostensible goal.  
Already then the convergence of drive attentions onto a prescribed set 
of socially-valorized goals seems unlikely, but the problem is more 
pronounced yet. We have also to take into account the fact that sublimation 
involves a change of objects, a change, as Lacan notes, chiming with Freud’s 
demands in Three Essays on Sexuality, “that doesn’t occur through the 
intermediary of a return of the repressed nor symptomatically…[but] in a 
way which satisfies directly” (p. 94). There is no apparent disjunction here, 
no redirection via the means of the symptom. (The methodological contrast 
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with Foucault’s privileged methodological concept of discontinuity is 
already pronounced here). Furthermore, insists Lacan (1992), sublimation 
cannot be collapsed into reaction-formation; it is not a defensive reaction 
that takes the form of the opposite impulse to what is socially-prohibited. 
Nor crucially, for Freud (1966a), is sublimation to be understood via the 
mechanics of repression. Freud (1966a) asks us not only to believe that the 
polymorphous field of sexual libido settles on a rather limited set of objects 
– where, moreover, it is able to find direct satisfaction – he asks us also to 
accept that these are “socially valorized objects of which the group 
approves…objects of public utility” (Lacan, p. 94).  
We need ask: given the amazing latitude within which libidinal 
gratifications may be achieved – not to mention the variety of substitutions 
afforded drive-impulses - then why the regularity and intensity of investment 
in objects of collective cultural value? Lacan immediately warns against 
what would appear an intuitive solution, the idea, in short, that we might 
resolve this difficulty by means of reference to “a simple opposition and a 
simple reconciliation between the individual and the collectivity” (p. 94). 
There is something too convenient about this move for Lacan, whereby the 
collective finds its satisfaction where the individual is already libidinally 
invested. Moreover, it poses not only a singular autonomy on the side of the 
subject’s libido (the coherence of ‘individual satisfaction’ in and of itself), it 
also implies a pre-destined integration of drive and environment that cannot 
but strike one as anathema to Freudian theory. Besides, Lacan reminds us, 
there is a further complication to consider here: Freud’s declaration that 
sublimation is a process of object rather than ego libido. 
To say that sublimation represents a fortuitous outcome to a 
potentially endlessly convoluted trajectory is an understatement. One thing 
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seems clear after having surveyed the dilemmas of sublimation: Lacan’s best 
explanatory hope lies not in the attempt to trace the endless complexity of a 
given libidinal genealogy, but rather in identifying the conditions of 
possibility underlying this field of permutations.  The enigma of how a 
short-circuit is set up between socially-valorized objects and direct drive 
satisfactions of the individual subject is something previous psychoanalysts 
have attempted to resolve by looking at the attributes of the objects of 
sublimation themselves (at how they may function as ‘stand-ins’ for the 
mother, for instance), and at vicissitudes of the drive that may modulate its 
course without fundamentally compromising its directness. Lacan, 
predictably, follows a different course. He eschews the attempt to trace the 
road-map of libidinal interest and their transformations; he likewise avoids 
tracking the idiosyncratic developments in the subject which would explain 
the extraordinary contingency whereby the plasticity of the “triebe” (drives) 
happen to find direct expression in society’s most prized activities and 
objects. He prefers instead to explore more carefully what underlies this 
knotted complex of factors, to examine the necessary structural conditions 
underlying such archaic libidinal activity. The same point can be made by 
citing Lacan: in the case of sublimation we should look predominantly 
“neither to the field of the intersubjective subject, [nor to] the subject 
subjected to the mediation of the signifier, but [rather to] what is behind this 
subject” (1992, p. 103). 
 
The field of das Ding 
Lacan’s response to the dilemmas of sublimation is enabled via an ingenious 
piece of inter-textuality. He identifies what is ostensibly the same element in 
two otherwise chronologically and thematically-diverse aspects of Freud’s 
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oeuvre. The “ding” of Project for a Scientific Psychology (1966c) is, he 
claims, one and the same as the primordial ‘object’ of satisfaction, the 
“Wieder zu finden”, the will to find again, present in the late (1966b) paper 
on negation. The Wieder zu finden is what for Freud “establishes the 
orientation of the human subject to the object” (Lacan, 1992, p. 58). The 
whole progress of the subject takes its cue from das Ding, this mythical 
‘proto-object’ which lies “[r]ight at the beginning of the organization of the 
world in the psyche, both logically and chronologically” and which provides 
the point “around which the whole adaptive development revolves” (p. 57).  
In the Project Freud (1966c) makes a point about the subject’s 
constitutive mis-adaptation to reality, which he links to their inability to 
adequately apprehend the other, indeed, to a constitutive absence in psychic 
life. Freud’s assertion is troubling not only in view of a commitment we 
might have to any rudimentary psychological realism – an affront, in other 
words, to the view that the subject directly knows their empirical domain – it 
is troubling also in view of the limitations it places on inter-subjectivity, on 
our ability to ever truly to know one another. In a section of the Project 
much valued by Lacanians, Freud takes the example of an infant’s 
perceptual engagement with another person: 
[T]he perceptual complexes proceeding from this fellow human-
being will in part be new and non-comparable…but other visual 
perceptions…will coincide in the subject with memories of quite 
similar impressions of his own body… Thus the complex of the 
fellow human-being falls apart into two components, of which one 
makes an impression by its constant structure and stays together as 
a thing, while the other can be understood by the activity of 
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memory…traced back to information from [the subject’s] own 
body (1966c, p. 331). 
This is a crucial passage. For a start, it emphasizes that the child’s initial 
interest in the other has much to do with the fact that “an object like this was 
simultaneously [their] first satisfying…and hostile object, as well as [their] 
sole helping power (Freud, 1966b, p. 331). There is thus a possibility of re-
finding pleasure here, in this object that simultaneously invokes the mother 
and the care she represents, and the prospect of a primal aggressiveness. 
This is not the only psychical filter which characterizes the subject’s 
relationship to their fellow being. The cognitive and perceptual information 
of this other is assimilated only via the subject’s experiences of their own 
body, by the route of their own foregoing experience. Arresting as these two 
modes of estrangement might appear – the facts that the other is known via 
its potential for pleasure/hostility, or through the prism of the subject’s 
image of his- or herself – neither is sufficient to explain what is most 
fundamentally alien in the other, this ‘thingness’ which defies recuperation 
into either inter-subjectivity or the terms of the reality principle. It is worth 
stressing here the factor of negativity. What knits psychological reality for 
the subject, what makes it cohesive, is not an attunement to reality and its 
objects, but rather a kind of subtraction. As Copjec (1994) avers, “it is only 
when our perceptions come to refer themselves to…[the] lost object of 
satisfaction that they can be deemed objective” (p. 233). This object is now 
excluded from our perceptions of mere worldly objects despite that “it now 
functions as that which is “in them more than them”” (Copjec, p. 233). 
 Given the dense series of formulations that Lacan will develop from 
his re-conceptualization of the Freudian ding – particular in relation to pure 
desire and the primacy of an unconscious Law that over-rides ‘the good’ - it 
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helps to focus on what, for psychoanalysis, is a familiar domain of 
exemplification: the primordial relation to the mother. One can speak of the 
mother as “the maternal thing” he claims, “insofar as she occupies the place 
of…das Ding (p. 67). Having said this, Lacan is immediately alive to the 
reductive capacity of such an equation, even as he is aware of the 
importance of the initial location of the mother within the co-ordinates of 
das Ding. (“Kleinian theory”, Lacan notes, in the ambivalent tone 
characteristic of his discussions of Klein, “depends on its having situated the 
mythic body of the mother at the central place of das Ding” (1992, p. 106)). 
Importantly then, while Lacan clearly does want to understand the relations 
of the subject to something primordial – indeed, in terms of “its attachment 
to the…most archaic of objects” (p. 106) - he nevertheless wishes to avoid 
the fixity of a singular, ‘nuclear’ object and its variants. He prefers instead to 
provide a operational definition of the field of das Ding which establishes 
the framework for such relations, for such Things.  
 
The force of subtraction 
When it comes to sublimation then, Lacan is less interested in the redirection 
of drives than with the opening up of a space, with a vacuum of jouissance. 
This voracious absence is strictly coterminous with that aspect of the other 
which evades human recognition, with that thing-like element which cannot 
be retrieved into symbolic or imaginary registers. In the case of das Ding we 
are dealing with the vanishing-point of humanity, with the radical alterity of 
the Nebenmensch (neighbour), with a blind-spot in psychical and moral 
apprehension that cannot be overcome, even by the most sincere attempts at 
empathy or inter-subjectivity. Such an unknowability cannot be reduced 
merely to ‘otherness’; it is tantamount instead to a cavity of desire, a 
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‘swallowing abyss’ that inculcates a response - indeed, an economy of 
attraction and avoidance - within the subject. Lacan has thus substituted for 
the lost primordial object of jouissance, a place, a power of emptiness, which 
makes such an object possible.  
Like the hollowness of the vase which for Heidegger (1968) defines 
its function – “If the vase may be filled”, says Lacan, “it is because…in its 
essence it is empty” (p. 120) – this is a thoroughly paradoxical emptiness. 
Hence Lacan’s comments: “the Thing…is there in a beyond”, “…the Thing 
is not nothing, but literally is not” (1992, p. 63). This is a nihil – a 
nothingness turned inside out, as one might put it - which engenders a kind 
of being; a nothing with a generative capacity. It is a fully positivized 
absence, an ‘extracted’ structural space for which there is no pre-ordained 
object, and for which there can be no perfect fit. Nonetheless, like the black-
hole to which it is often compared, das Ding exerts a potent gravitational 
field, and in so doing it elicits sublime passions – and, wagers Lacan, effects 
of creation - ex nihilo, out of a void. This then is the productive force of 
subtraction which is able to bring Things into existence on the basis of its 
sheer emptiness. So although no single object can occupy this space 
indefinitely, an ongoing succession of ‘sacred’ cultural objects and practices 
will be resident here, assuming, at particular historical junctures, the sublime 
status according such a position.  
What Lacan achieves with this conceptualization is to connect more 
explicitly the inassimilable foreignness that is das Ding to the impossible 
object of the Wieder zu finden. More than this, he pinpoints the place of the 
primal object of desire, isolating thus the pull of a radical form of desire 
which must remain empty, never finally embodied in any one object. He 
thus sets us on the track of a psychoanalytic ethics, which is an ethics of the 
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fidelity to the empty form of desire itself (Neill, 2007, Zupančič, 2000) over 
and above the particularity of any of its instantiations. 
The extraordinary object status of das Ding helps Lacan resolve - or at 
least clarify - certain of the paradoxes of Freud’s object of ‘primordial 
satisfaction’. We are presented here with an ostensibly negative ontology. 
This is an object, thought to embody a type of full jouissance, which the 
subject never possessed but that remains nevertheless more real – certainly 
in its ability to inculcate desire - than anything that they do; an object that is 
strictly irretrievable despite our incessant attempts at its (impossible) re-
finding. This is an object, moreover, that puts into play a fantasmatic 
prehistory: what we never had is now the ‘what came before’, and that 
which is fundamentally inaccessible is that which we believe we can enjoy 
once again. 
There is a further complication involved in Lacan’s re-
conceptualization of the primordial object of desire. This ‘proto-object’ of 
das Ding is both that which inaugurates an original division in the 
experience of reality – the division which sets desire in motion – and that 
“from within the subject which finds itself led to a first outside” (Lacan, 
1992, p. 52). How then are we to resolve this contradiction in which das 
Ding, the ‘first outside’, correlates to something within the subject, without 
deferring to a naïve account of projection, something which Lacan clearly 
wishes to avoid? It helps to reiterate again here that we are not speaking 
simply of an object of perceptual reality, an object in the phenomenological 
field which corresponds to a representation the subject has in mind, but of 
the Wieder zu finden to which the perceptual work of finding ‘real objects’ is 
subordinated. This is not as such an issue of ‘reality correspondences’, but of 
an abyss that opens up amongst the objects of the everyday world, a vacuum 
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that is the unavoidable structural counterpart of the pull to re-find the object 
of satisfaction. The recalcitrance of this lost satisfaction and the void it 
leaves in the subject is strictly coterminous with the unsatisfactory nature of 
worldly objects, with the drive to re-find the impossible object of jouissance. 
It is for this reason that Lacan (1992) remarks that “das Ding is at the centre 
only in the sense that it is excluded”, advancing furthermore “[t]hat…in 
reality das Ding has to be posited as exterior…[as] something strange to me, 
although…at the heart of me” (p. 71).  Hence Lacan’s subsequent 
formulations in the same seminar concerning the notion of the ‘excluded 
inside’ or “extimacy”, that is, the intimate exteriority of the Thing. It is for 
the same reason that Žižek offers a description of das Ding as the Thing 
from inner space (2000a). 
 
Law ex nihilo 
The above suffices as a summary of what is set in play by the force of das 
Ding as a ‘proto-object’, or more accurately, as the evacuated object of 
desire that is co-extensive with the radically vacated place occupied by the 
sublime. Not only then are we confronted in das Ding with the founding of 
desire: this absence evokes for us, in its empty abyssal aspect, the possibility 
of a primordial enjoyment that has long since been voided, and whose 
replacement remains an impossible imperative. We are destined as such to 
confront a succession of secondary objects that pale in comparison to a 
former satisfaction, to something bigger, more gigantic in libidinal value. 
What results is precisely a kind of massification whereby das Ding – despite 
that its presumed satisfactions cannot be accessed, despite that it has no 
object-existence – looms larger than the perceptual reality of everyday 
objects. 
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We must not neglect the fact that das Ding is for Lacan the epicentre 
of jouissance, it is “enjoyment incarnated”, a vortex that exerts upon us the 
fascination of a consuming enjoyment that we desperately hold at bay even 
as it draws us ever closer in. Lacan evokes in this respect the etymological 
link in French between ‘to search’ and ‘detour’ to ground his description of 
this, the magnetic field of attractions and repulsions implied by the presence 
of das Ding. There is thus a push-pull relation, a type of suspension in 
operation which necessitates that we don’t come too close, that we keep our 
distance. This is how Lacan understands the regulations of the pleasure 
principle in Seminar VII, as that which governs the search for the object in 
such a way that detours and avoidances play an integral role, and that result 
in an orbiting motion, a monitored distance “from that which it gravitates 
around”, such that “[t]he object to be found confers on the search its 
invisible law” (Lacan, 1992, p. 58).  
The automatic regulation of an orbiting distance to a “full” jouissance 
that would consume us, this asymptotic line of approach is what for Lacan 
underlies the persistence and the apparent universality of the incest taboo. 
We are dealing here with the instantaneous generation of an unconscious 
law, a law of distance, of prohibition – and here we find a longstanding 
anthropological conundrum - not simply generated within or by culture but 
which is, by contrast, sometimes treated as the basis for culture itself.  It is a 
law for which we are able to find innumerable justifications and reasons – a 
law which culture no doubt institutionalizes and obeys – despite that it 
predates such proscriptions. We have thus the odd convergence that Lacan 
points to, of that which is prohibited and that which is anyway impossible. 
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The position of the Thing 
This is what a Foucauldian analytics fails to grasp in its insistence on 
grounding the complex historical and discursive causes underwriting various 
developments of power: the spontaneous emergence – and, indeed, the great 
tenacity - of an unconscious law that regulates the relation to the Thing. This 
is a law before culture, certainly before discursive constructions, that various 
cultural and symbolic institutions are able to use as their affective base. The 
“grey, meticulous and patiently documentary” (Foucault, 1984, p. 76) work 
of detailed genealogical analysis will register the effects of such nodal points 
of libidinal investment without being able to adequately explain them. The 
apparent ex nihilo emergence of such a law, and its structural necessity 
within the field of jouissance and desire, means that it is not easily rooted in 
the genealogical field of contingent material forces and discursive power-
relations.  
We are in a better position now to appreciate the well-known 
Lacanian definition of sublimation as “the object elevated to the dignity of 
the Thing” and how it might apply to a critique of Foucault. As noted above, 
Lacan bypasses a particular route of analytical engagement in his account of 
sublimation, a route which, interestingly enough, might be said to 
correspond to aspects of Foucault’s genealogical tracking of the formative 
powers of technologies of subjectivity. Rather than relying on the steady 
accumulation of layer upon layer of historical data, embarking on a search 
that tackles “a field of entangled and confused parchments….documents that 
have been scratched over and recopied many times” (Foucault, 1984, p. 76), 
Lacan opts instead to isolate the necessary conditions of possibility 
underlying sublimation. He thus avoids what a Foucauldian framework of 
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technologies of self implies it can provide: an itinerary connecting a given 
subject’s practices and objects of sublimation – that is, the privatized or 
individualized domain of ideals (in Foucault’s terms, ethics) – to what is 
sacred to or valued by a culture – that is, the vaunted ideals of a particular 
culture and its technologies of subjectivity (for Foucault, the realm of 
morals).  
Lacan’s approach, by contrast, is to point to a necessary structural 
place around which a culture’s select objects and practices come to coalesce. 
Rather than painstakingly tracing all of the multiple permutations whereby 
the influence of sublime cultural objects come to be effectively 
individualized, he opts to looks to what functions as a precondition of such 
varied lines of articulation and influence. By focussing on das Ding as the 
proto-object, or, more accurately, as the object-place, he avoids the detoured 
circuit of a modulated drive across the varying and changing terrain of a 
culture’s most valued objects: das Ding is always, as it were, the direct 
‘unmediated’ drive target. The methodological privileging of discontinuity 
here is to miss the point. 
In more straightforward terms, it is the structural place which is 
primary, not the objects or practices which come to occupy this place, which 
are of course subject to considerable socio-historical variation. Moreover, it 
is not the direction of the drive that is changed, diverted – as in other 
psychoanalytic theorizations - what is changed is the status of the object, its 
position in the structure of fantasy. This object, which under different 
conditions may be pathetic, deplorable, wholly undesirable, is, to borrow 
Kay’s wonderful phrase, “thoroughly irradiated by the drive, bathed in 
jouissance, transfigured, spiritualized and resplendent” (2003, pp. 54-55) 
once it is elevated to this position. One needs emphasize here the radically 
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inter-subjective status of fantasy in Lacanian theory, the fact that fantasmatic 
objects are always the response given to the vexing question of what the ‘big 
Other’ – the amassed embodiment of a given social-historical-cultural 
network of values - is imputed to want. Never merely private then (or, 
indeed intra-subjective), a fantasy is always a negotiated outcome, a 
hypothesis generated by an individual’s or a society’s best guess at what its 
Other most desires. Importantly then, the concept of the Other operates at 
both the level of the individual subject and at that of the imaginary of a 
given society. As De Kesel (2009) makes clear, the same holds for the 
notion of sublimation. To this we should add the immediate qualification 
that these two registers of sublimation are intimately connected. Indeed, in 
light of the trans-individual nature of unconscious subjectivity – which for 
Lacan is constantly generating answers to the enigma of what the Other 
wants – these orders of fantasy can never be fully separable: subjective 
fantasy occurs within the parameters of the Other, within the realm of the 
signifier. 
This then is where we find the short-circuit between the recalcitrance 
of archaic libido – primal drive aspirations – and socially-valorized objects. 
And to be sure, this is a short-circuit not only between drive and culture, but 
between the subjective and the collective. Inasmuch as the drive reaches 
towards the objectives provided by the co-ordinates of (radically inter-
subjective) fantasy, this drive will directly and ‘automatically’ be put on 
course towards the cultural Thing. 
Why then does this notion of the Thing make for such a crucial 
contribution to the theorization of psychical power? Why, furthermore, does 
it deliver such a telling blow to the empirico-historicist Foucauldian 
enterprise of tracing multiple (if discontinuous) lines of causality within the 
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over-arching schema of disciplinary-bio-power? It is crucial because it 
makes clear that you do not have to be acted upon to sublimate, to produce 
versions of das Ding that both tie you into a culture and that lock you into a 
regimes of adherence, reverence and distance relative to it. Just as das Ding 
is not the result of repression, so it is equally not the result of even a positive 
or proactive coercion, of Foucault’s productive powers of technologies of 
subjectivity. Das Ding is not to be located within the rationality of effects; it 
is not a produced effect but is instead a precondition of a variety of effects. 
One must here agree with Dolar (1999): many of the 
disciplinary/governmental outcomes that Foucault seizes upon in his later 
genealogical works may thus be explained, at least partially, without 
reference to the complicated apparatuses and attenuated rationalities of 
governmentality. Indeed, the latter may be said to presuppose a variety of 
psychical mechanisms, of which the orchestrations of sublimation would 
seem crucial. 
Via his re-conceptualization of the Freudian problematic of 
sublimation, Lacan shows us what Foucault cannot theorize, namely the fact 
of a self-instantiating form of productive power that does not require a direct 
causative connection to a heterogeneous ensemble of material forces and 
discursive practices. If sublimation consists of a relation to the real of das 
Ding, then it cannot be limited in the terms of its activation and ongoing 
insistence to the powers of the discursive domain alone; it remains rather a 
self-initiating and self-regulating form of power. In das Ding then we have 
then a prospective answer to the question with which we opened concerning 
a particular ‘mode of impossibility’ – that is, an impasse of desire linked to a 
mobilization of jouissance - that enables power, that so extends the reach of 
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the ensembles of power-knowledge, the technologies of subjectivity, studied 
by Foucault.  
 
Paradigms of sublimation 
Let me close with a series of questions. What might be the dispositif of a 
particular order of sublimation? Differently put: could sublimation itself 
function as a category of historical analysis? Given the intersection of 
conceptual frameworks implied by such a question - the conjunction in other 
words, of Foucauldian and Lacanian approaches, whose incompatibility is 
typically presumed – many would query whether this is even a viable 
research question. Perhaps it is. Take for example Lacan’s (1992) 
description of the emergence of the courtly love tradition, which he views as 
the “appearance, articulation, establishment, of a whole moral code…a 
whole ethic, a whole way of life” (p. 125). Clearly then, courtly love is more 
than a mode of writing, a discursive style: it entails a series of prescribed 
norms of interaction and behaviour, and more than this, specific codes that 
function to regulate the relations between man and woman. In this brief 
discussion of historicized (‘ethical’) codes of behaviour there is greater 
proximity between Foucault and Lacan than we may have expected. 
 This discussion of the courtly love tradition cannot be ignored on the 
basis that it lacks sufficient historical contextualization. Moreover, the 
addition of further layers of empirical analysis will not necessarily deepen 
our understanding of the longstanding cultural importance of such 
phenomena. Lacan’s point is precisely that once one has examined the 
requisite social, political and economic evidence, “applied all the available 
modes of interpretation of the superstructure”, historians are still at a loss to 
account for the endurance “success of this extraordinary fashion” (p. 125). 
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 What this opens up is a distinctive and promising analytical 
perspective, one that welcomes the precision of socio-historical 
contextualization as part of its attempt to apprehend what Leader (2002) 
refers to as ‘paradigms of sublimation’, in other words, those frames of 
ethical sensibility and practice that have gained hegemonic ascendance at 
particular historical junctures. Courtly love would seem a perfectly viable 
subject of consideration for a Foucauldian analytics able to plot the lateral 
spread of such codes, values and behaviours across a variety of 
particularized institutional settings and discursive practices. One could argue 
that this is the limitation of Žižek’s (1993) recourse to one particular 
paradigm of sublimation, that is, his frequent use of explanations of the 
national Thing: they are not adequately informed of the texture of a variety 
of multiple institutionalized realizations, of the modulations underlying the 
gradual transformation of one version of the Thing into another. To be 
perfectly clear then: my suggestion here is by no means that a Lacanian 
perspective on impasses of desire simply negates a Foucauldian project. By 
contrast, the Lacanian notion of paradigms of sublimation offers the prospect 
of a novel, additional category for a Foucauldian analysis of historically-
specific variants of power. 
There is a related consideration. We have established that das Ding 
evades retrieval into symbolic or imaginary registers. The fact of this place, 
the fact of its operation, and the unconscious law it entails, cannot thus be 
said to be constructed, they are not subject to deconstruction. Having said 
that, Lacan is aware that the field of das Ding, let us say the various objects 
that come to occupy this position, become the focus of imaginary, cultural 
and indeed manipulative political elaborations. There is in this sense, a 
continual attempt to colonize the field of das Ding, this, after all is for Lacan 
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“how collective, socially acceptable sublimations operate” (p. 99). This 
opens up an important question: how might it be possible to de-sublimate 
certain cultural Things, to use de-sublimation as a political strategy? 
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